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Abstract: 
Cloud computing is likened and equated to the Industrial Revolution. Its transformational nature 
is, however, associated with significant security and privacy risks. This paper investigates how 
the contexts provided by formal and informal institutions affect the perceptions of privacy and 
security issues in the cloud. This paper highlights the nature, origin, and implications of 
institutions and institutional changes in the context of cloud computing. A goal of the present 
work is also to gain insights into the mechanisms and forces that have brought about institutional 
changes in the cloud industry. Specifically, they investigate how contradictions generated at 
various levels by the technology, the formation of dense networks and relationships and the 
changing power dynamics have triggered institutional changes. Since the current analysis of the 
causes and consequences of institutions and institutional change is mainly concerned with more 
established industries and markets, this paper is expected to provide insights into institutions 
surrounding to this new and emerging technological development. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing (hereinafter: cloud) is described in the popular press as the next big thing and a 
major technology disruption (Weber, 2011). It is likened and equated to the Industrial Revolution 
in terms of implications for technological innovations and economic growth (Price, 2011). At the 
same time, the transformational nature of the cloud is associated with significant security and 
privacy risks. 
 
A significant gap remains between vendors' claims and users' views of the cloud's security, 
privacy and transparency. The cloud industry's response has been: Clouds are more secure than 
whatever you're using now (Talbot, 2010). But many users do not agree. Issues such as security, 
privacy and availability are among the topmost concerns in organizations' cloud adoption 
decisions rather than the total cost of ownership (Brodkin, 2010 and McCreary, 2008; Table 1). 
Allen (2011, p. 3) notes: “One of the largest disadvantages of cloud computing revolves around 
security and confidentiality”. Due primarily to concerns related to security, privacy and 
confidentiality critics have argued that its perceived costs may outweigh the benefits (Tillery, 
2010). Organizations worry about hidden costs associated with security breaches or lawsuits tied 
to data breach. Businesses and consumers are cautious in using it to store high-value or sensitive 
data and information (Goodburn & Hill, 2011). 
Table 1. 
Organizations' perceptions of the cloud's security: Some representative surveys. 
Survey conducted by Conducted/released 
in 
Major findings 
IDC October 2008 • 
Security concern was the most serious barrier to cloud 
adoption for organizations. 
Information week 2009 and 2010 • 
31% of companies in 2010 viewed SaaS Apps as less secure 
than the internal systems compared to 35% in 2009 (Ely, 
2011). 
IDC (conducted in Asia-Pacific) April 2010 • 
Less than 10% of respondents were confident about cloud 
security measures. 
Harris Interactive survey for Novell October 2010 • 
90% were concerned about cloud security. 
• 
50 viewed security concerns as the primary barrier to cloud 
adoption. 
• 
76% thought private data more secure when stored on the 
premises. 
• 
81% were worried about regulatory compliance. 
Survey conducted by Conducted/released 
in 
Major findings 
IDC 2011 • 
A third of IT executives feel the benefits of cloud exceed 
risks. 
• 
About a quarter did not fully understand the regulatory and 
compliance issues in cloud computing, a. 
• 
47% concerned about a security threat (Ricadela, 2011) 
Cisco's CloudWatch 2011 report for the 
U.K. (research conducted by Loudhouse) 
September 2011 • 
76% of respondents cited security and privacy a top barrier to 
cloud adoption. 
 •  64% of respondents concerned about location of data 
(Nguyen, 2011). 
 
The central argument of this paper is that security and privacy issues in the cloud, which are real 
as well as perceived phenomena, can be better understood by examining the formal and informal 
institutions. Due to the lack of development in cloud-related legal systems and enforcement 
mechanisms, privacy, security and ownership issues in the cloud fall into legally gray areas 
(Bradley, 2010). Some argue that if an organization dealing with customer data stores them in 
the cloud provided by a vendor, the organization rather than the vendor is likely to be legally 
responsible if customer data are compromised (Zielinski, 2009). This is because while the 
organization may face a lawsuit from the victims, the vendor may not have to take responsibility 
under the existing institutional arrangements. Some commentators have argued that there has 
been arguably a “disturbing lack of respect for essential privacy” among cloud providers (Larkin, 
2010, p. 44). For instance, in a complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) argued that Google misrepresented privacy and 
security of its users' data stored in the Google cloud (Wittow & Buller, 2010). Cloud providers 
are also criticized on the ground that they do not conduct adequate background security 
investigations of their employees (Wilshusen, 2010). 
 
The issues related to security and privacy in the cloud, while well documented, are only partially 
understood. A clearer understanding of various institutional actors, their actions and how they 
are shifting would help organizations navigate the complex, turbulent and rapidly evolving cloud 
landscape. Researchers have paid relatively less attention to how the structure of the markets, 
legal and political environment as well as inter-organizational and intra-organizational 
arrangements affect the ways in which investment decisions are made. This paper seeks to fill 
part of this void by examining the role of institutions and institutional evolution concerning 
cloud security and privacy. 
 
Before proceeding, some clarifying definitions are offered. Institutions are the “rules of the 
game” (North, 1990, p. 27) and include “formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics” (North, 1996, p. 344). Cloud computing involves hosting 
applications on servers and delivering software and services via the Internet. In the cloud 
computing model, companies can access computing power and resources on the cloud and pay 
for services based on the usage. Cloud industry is defined as the set of sellers/providers of cloud 
related products and services. 
 
Cloud providers or vendors, which are suppliers of cloud services, deliver value to users through 
various offerings such as software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS). SaaS is a software distribution model, in which applications are 
hosted by a vendor and made available to customers over a network. It is considered to be the 
most mature type of cloud computing. In PaaS, applications are developed and executed through 
platforms provided by cloud vendors. This model allows a quick and cost-effective development 
and deployment of applications. Some well-known PaaS vendors include Google (Google App 
Engine), Salesforce.com (Force.com), and Microsoft (Windows Azure platform). Some facilities 
provided under PaaS model include database management, security, workflow management, and 
application serving. In IaaS, compute power and storage space are offered on demand. IaaS can 
provide server, operating system, disk storage and database, among other things. Amazon.com is 
the biggest IaaS provider. Its Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) allows subscribers to run cloud 
application programs. IBM, Vmware and HP also offer IaaS. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds by first presenting the theoretical framework. Next, 
institutions and institutional evolution in the cloud industry are discussed. Then, the forces and 
nature of institutional changes in the cloud industry are examined. It is followed by a section on 
discussion and implications. The final section provides concluding comments. 
 
2. The theoretical framework: Institutions and institutional changes 
The cloud industry is undergoing a major technological upheaval. In most cases, such changes 
create confusion and uncertainty and produce an environment that lacks norms, templates, and 
models about appropriate strategies, structures and sources of legitimacy (Newman, 2000). 
Existing institutions are inadequate and obsolete to deal with the security and privacy problems 
facing the cloud. For instance, the cloud has challenged traditional institutional arrangements and 
notions about auditing and security (Messmer, 2010). 
 
Formal and informal institutions affect perception of legitimacy and trustworthiness of the cloud. 
The responses to technological innovations of institutional actors such as technology developers, 
users and regulators, however, tend to lag behind the innovations (Katyal, 2001). Moreover, 
institutional actors vary in their timing of responses due to different vested interests, capability to 
respond and various levels of understanding about the issues. In addition, research conducted in 
other industry sectors indicates that organizations may have different approaches to ethical 
decision making in their interactions with other businesses, consumers and the government 
(Whitcomb, Erdener, & Li, 1998). While trade and professional associations and industry bodies 
have responded to security and privacy issues, government agencies have been slow to adopt 
necessary legislative and regulatory measures to monitor users and providers. 
 
Institutional theory deals with the issue of seeking legitimacy, approval and support from various 
actors in the environment (Dickson et al., 2004 and Campbell, 2004). Institutional influence in 
the cloud industry becomes an admittedly complex process when cloud providers and their 
clients need to derive legitimacy from multiple sources such as employees, clients, client's 
customers, professional/trade associations and governments. 
 
Scott (2001) proposed three institutional pillars: (i) regulative; (ii) normative and (iii) cognitive. 
These pillars relate to “legally sanctioned”, “morally governed” and “recognizable, taken-for-
granted” behaviors, respectively (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000, p. 238). The following 
examples illustrate the three pillars from the standpoint of cloud security and privacy. 
 
The European Union (EU) countries' strong data privacy laws prevent the movement of 
identifiable individuals' data to jurisdictions that do not provide the same levels of protection. 
These regulative institutions have arguably hindered the diffusion of the cloud in the EU 
countries (Bradner, 2010). 
 
Many cloud vendors emphasize their security credentials by communicating to clients that they 
have completed the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS 70) audit (Brodkin, 2010). Note that 
the SAS 70 Audit developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
represents that a service organization has been “through an in-depth audit of their control 
objectives and control activities” which may include controls over IT and related processes (SAS 
70 Overview, 2011). By communicating about their SAS 70 compliance, they are emphasizing 
on normative institutions related to the cloud industry. An organization's cloud adoption decision 
may also depend on its perception of the providers' ability to protect data from a third party, 
make them available when needed and a trust that the provider would not engage in opportunistic 
behavior. This mental map can be described as a component of cognitive institutions (Talbot, 
2010). 
 
2.1. Institutional field 
Drawing on the analysis of Schumpeter (1939), Antonelli (1993, p. 621) points out that an 
analysis of “the collective character of the innovation process, the interdependence among 
innovators, and the complementarity of the new technologies within the gales of innovations”, 
and the “intertwined co-evolution of economic institutions, industrial structures, economic 
architectures of interactions and exchanges and consumers' preferences along with the innovative 
process” would offer important insights into the “systemic and inherently complex character of 
the innovation dynamics”. To put things in context, security and privacy issues are shaped by 
expectations, values, positions, power, influence, resources, roles, concerns, orientation and 
interests of various institutional actors that have different levels of understanding and are 
affected differentially by these issues. In this regard, the idea of institutional field can be helpful 
in understanding institutions and institutional changes associated with the cloud. 
 
An institutional field is “formed around the issues that become important to the interests and 
objectives of specific collectives of organizations” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 352). For the cloud 
industry, this institutional field includes national governments, supra-national organizations, 
industry bodies, trade and professional associations as well as cloud vendors, cloud clients and 
the organizations of these clients (Fig. 1, Table 2). The “content, rhetoric, and dialog” among 
these constituents influence the nature of field formed around the cloud (Hoffman, 1999, p. 355). 
 
Fig. 1.  
Actions of and interactions among various institutional actors associated with the cloud industry. 
Table 2. 
A sample of actions and responses of various actors in shaping cloud related institutions. 
Actor Nature and sources of powers A sample of actions 
Cloud users Relative power vis-a-vis the 
providers has increased with an 
intense competition. 
• After users' complaints about data ownership issues, 
Dropbox updated its user terms/conditions. 
Cloud vendor Decreasing relative power but 
attempting to increase potential 
power by offering users with new, 
innovative and potentially 
attractive value propositions. 
• HiDrive Free: conform to the ISO27001 security 
standard. 
• Epsilon and AWS: SAS 70 certified. 
• Salesforce.com's acquisition of Navajo Systems for 
$30 million (Team, 2011). 
• Dell's acquisition of SecureWorks (Claburn, 2011). 
• To win federal-government deals, AWS and Google 
undertook efforts to improve security to achieve 
certification for FISMA. 
• HiDrive Free: hosted at German data centers, which 
ensures that its service conforms to German privacy 
Actor Nature and sources of powers A sample of actions 
laws, which are among the world's strictest (Cooter, 
2011). 
Associations 
representing cloud 
users 
Norms, informal rules, ethical 
codes and expert power. 
• AICPA's official endorsements to Paychex, Intacct 
and Copanion. 
• CSA: as an independent voice promotes the use of 
best practices for providing security assurance and 
provides education for users. 
Inter-organizational 
bodies representing 
cloud vendors 
The power of collective action. • ETNO: lobbied for an international privacy standard, 
simplification of rules governing data transfers, and 
others—expected to enable European companies to 
compete with those in the U.S. (Ingthorsson, 2011). 
• Oracle, Cisco Systems, SAP, Apple, Google and 
Microsoft: lobbied to streamline EU's fragmented 
national data protection laws. In January 2011, 
Microsoft general counsel, spoke to the French 
National Assembly to lower cloud barriers (O'Brien, 
2011). 
• The OASIS IDCloud TC: works to address security 
challenges associated with identity management and 
develops guidelines for overcoming vulnerabilities. 
National 
governments 
Coercive power over citizens and 
businesses. 
• FISMA in the U.S.: cloud providers are required to 
keep sensitive data belonging to a federal agency within 
the country. 
• The U.S. and the U.K.: legislations governing the 
location of storage for personal and medical data. 
• China's investment of US$154 million to develop a 
cloud center for high-tech and start-up firms in 
Chongqing. The cloud computing Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) will be free of the 
country's strict internet censorship filters (Russell, 
2011). 
• European countries considering relaxing strict data 
privacy laws to facilitate cloud adoption (European 
Commission 2010). 
Supra-national 
institutions 
Nations mostly observe principles 
of international law and 
obligations: can resolve 
transnational problems. 
• EU planning to make mandatory to notify customers 
of data breaches. 
• European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee: 
recommended making easier for users to access, amend 
and delete data and appointing dedicated data 
protection officers in companies (Worth, 2011). 
Actor Nature and sources of powers A sample of actions 
• European Commission: emphasizing the importance 
of easing users to change cloud provider by developing 
de facto standard for moving data among different 
clouds (overcoming the lock-in). 
• EU members working to align privacy laws and close 
jurisdictional gaps. 
 
Institutional theorists make an intriguing argument as to how a field evolves. A field is a 
dynamic system characterized by the entry and exit of various players and constituencies with 
competing interests and disparate purposes and a change in interaction patterns among them 
(Barnett & Carroll, 1993). As is the case of any issue-based field, these players continuously 
negotiate over issue interpretation and engage in institutional war (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). 
This dynamics in the context of the cloud industry is presented in Fig. 1. The last column of 
Table 2 provides a sample of actions related to the boxes in Fig. 1. 
 
Prior researchers have noted that fields evolve through three stages (Purdy & Gray, 2009). In the 
innovation stage, new logics related to security and privacy concerns in the cloud are introduced 
and are drawn into debate. The cloud industry is probably in the second stage, mobilization, in 
which field development is characterized by a complex power dynamics. For instance, cloud 
providers are attempting to exercise their power based on expertise, experience and knowledge 
and are engaging in technology push without sufficiently addressing the security and privacy 
concerns. Many users, on the other hand, are exercising their bargaining power and voicing 
frustration with vendors' failures to address these issues. At the same time, some governments 
are using the coercive power of the state to use the cloud in spying on citizens. Institutional 
actors such as cloud vendors, organizations using the cloud and regulators in this mobilization 
stage compete to validate and implement their logics. For instance, cloud vendors are relying on 
the economic logic of the cloud's low TCO to persuade cloud user. Some cloud users' logics are 
based on the idea that the cloud's costs are likely to outweigh the benefits in the absence of 
strong security measures. The final stage is the structuration stage, in which logics are translated 
into practices (Reay, Golden-Biddle, & GermAnn, 2006). In this stage, norms and structures are 
standardized and institutions deepen their taken-for-grantedness (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). It 
is clear that institutional fields around the cloud have not yet reached the structuration stage. 
 
Prior research indicates that institutional evolution entails transitions among the three 
institutional pillars—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. Building a regulative/law 
pillar system is the first stage of field formation. It is followed by a formation of normative 
institutions (e.g., assessment from ethical viewpoint) and then cognitive institutions (e.g., 
culturally supported belief) (Hoffman, 1999). 
 
The formation of regulative pillar for the cloud industry would be characterized by the 
establishment of legal and regulatory infrastructures to deal with many issues including security 
and privacy. A normative institutional pillar is said to be established if ethical, and social views 
start influencing these issues. That is, rich and well developed ethical codes, guidelines and 
traditions develop in the cloud industry. Likewise, a cognitive pillar is established if cloud 
related decisions of organizations and individuals are culturally and cognitively determined. 
 
3. Institutions and institutional evolution in the cloud industry 
Another way to examine the factors related to privacy and security issues of the cloud is to 
consider a broad approach which defines the concept of institution in terms of a game's 
equilibrium. This framework is based on insights from game theory in which the basic idea is 
that agents (e.g., cloud vendors, users, etc.) would adopt strategies which are rational at the 
individual level. Three factors that determine an equilibrium include “(i) technologically 
determined external constraints; (ii) humanly devised external constraints, and; (iii) constraints 
developed within the game through patterns of behavior and the creation of expectations” 
(Snidal, 1996, p. 128). This section examines these factors, mainly (ii) and (iii), in the context of 
the cloud industry. Various institutional forces that are likely to push the cloud industry and 
markets towards equilibrium are presented in Table 2 and Table 3, and Fig. 1. Nature and 
sources of powers of various institutional actors associated with the cloud industry and some 
examples of their actions and responses in shaping cloud related institutions summarized in 
Table 2 and Fig. 1. Table 3 shows the possible institutional changes in the cloud industry as well 
as the associated mechanisms and forces. 
Table 3. 
Institutional evolution in the cloud industry. 
Type of 
institutions 
Likely changes Mechanisms/forces 
Regulative Governments are likely to face pressures to 
strengthen cloud-related legal system and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
• The transformational nature of the cloud forces the 
government to develop regulative institutions. 
• Spillover and externality effects may arise from the 
government agencies' demands of secure cloud for 
their use. 
 Governments may face pressures to • The globalization effect and position of international 
Type of 
institutions 
Likely changes Mechanisms/forces 
harmonize and align their legal systems and 
enforcement mechanisms with those of other 
countries. 
institutions to affect national policies. 
Normative Industry: processes for auditing cloud 
platforms are likely to evolve. 
• Participants in an industry such as cloud computing 
benefit from compatibility and hence may push for a 
standard. 
• They are also interested in strengthening security and 
privacy issues. 
 Professional and trade associations: are 
likely to emerge and influence security and 
privacy issues in new ways. 
• In nascent and formative sectors such as cloud, there 
is no developed network of regulatory institutions. In 
such settings, professional and trade associations may 
emerge to play unique and important roles in shaping 
the industry. 
• They tend to have expertise, resources, experience 
and interests in this issue. 
• They may assess and monitor the performance of 
cloud vendors, which can help minimize risks for the 
members (e.g., AICPA). 
Cognitive Facing demanding consumers that are more 
aware and better educated about 
privacy/security, cloud vendors are likely to 
be equipped with improved mental map of 
the cloud environment. 
• Cloud vendors are forced to engage in trust 
production processes. 
• Redistribution of power. 
 Users may overcome the inertia effect. • Users' expectations, values, and concerns about 
localness and control may change with thickening 
institutions and an understanding of and experience 
with the cloud. 
 
3.1. Regulative institutions and their evolution 
Regulative institutions consist of “explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities” (Scott, 1995, p. 35). In the context of this paper, regulative institutions 
consist of existing laws and rules, mainly enacted before the cloud era but are also relevant in the 
context of cloud computing. Some examples include the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act and the 
Health and Human Services Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the 
U.S. To ensure the accuracy of financial data as required by the SOX compliance, IT controls 
need to be designed to ensure that data are accurate and are protected from unauthorized 
changes. HIPAA requires healthcare providers to have technical, physical and administrative 
security measures in place to protect the privacy, integrity, and availability of patients' data. 
Those not complying with HIPAA standards may face up to $250,000 in fines and up to 10 years 
in prison. 
 
3.1.1. Laws governing data in the cloud 
The importance of regulative institutions such as laws, contracts and courts in the cloud industry 
should be obvious if this industry is viewed against the backdrop of the current state of security 
standards. The state uses coercive power in order to gain compliance. In the absence of radical 
improvements in security technology, such institutions become even more important because 
cloud users can rely on these institutions in case a cloud provider's failure to deliver a given level 
of security (Armbrust et al., 2010). 
 
The cloud-related legal system and enforcement mechanisms are evolving more slowly 
compared to the technological development. Compliance frameworks such as the SOX and the 
HIPAA were developed for the non-cloud environment and thus do not clearly define the 
guidelines and requirements for data in the cloud (Bradley, 2010). Cloud computing thus poses 
various challenges for companies that have responsibilities to meet stringent compliance related 
to these frameworks such as IT disaster recovery and data security (NW, 2010). 
 
The cloud also has several important new and unique features, which create challenges in writing 
contracts. For instance, a case concerning the contracts between Google and Computer Sciences 
Corporation (CSC) with the City of Los Angeles indicated several problems related to data 
breach and indemnification of damages. Google was a CSC subcontractor in the arrangement. 
An attorney analyzing the case noted that some of the complexity in the case would have been 
avoided if the term "lost data" was defined more clearly in the contracts (NW, 2010). 
 
Some regulations governing the cloud are impractical and unclear. While it would not be 
practical to hold cloud providers liable for everything (TR, 2010), current regulations governing 
cloud security, which are derived from previous generations of technologies, arguably favor 
cloud providers. For instance, in the event of a data breach, the client, not the vendor, is likely to 
be legally responsible (Zielinski, 2009). 
 
According to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), cloud providers are 
required to keep sensitive data belonging to a federal agency within the country. Google Apps 
used by government agencies are FISMA certified (Brodkin, 2010). Government agencies' 
increasing use of the cloud and the fact that data security is extremely important for these 
agencies suggest that forward thinking governments may soon realize the need of clearer 
regulatory framework to address security issues. In addition, spillover and externality effects 
may arise from the government agencies' demands of secure clouds. A side effect of Google's 
delivery of secure clouds to government agencies is that private sector players are likely to 
become aware and interested in such services. Over time, Google thus may face pressure to 
provide the equivalent of FISMA certified Apps for the private sector as well. 
 
3.1.2. International harmonization and alignment of legal system and enforcement mechanisms 
Due to the globalization effect, governments are facing international pressures to harmonize and 
align legal systems and enforcement mechanisms. National governments are increasingly turning 
to supra-national institutions to resolve transnational problems (Smith & Wiest, 2005). Henkin 
(1979, p. 47) noted that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and 
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”. 
 
The cloud is also a matter of national competitiveness and security. Governments are thus 
enacting new laws and revising existing regulations to enhance the international competitiveness 
of domestic firms (Table 2, Fig. 1). In many cases, these actions have been in response to interest 
group pressures. For instance, industry associations such as the European Telecommunications 
Network Operator's Association (ETNO) as well as organizations such as Oracle, Cisco Systems, 
SAP, Apple, Google and Microsoft have been engaged in organized lobbying efforts to influence 
cloud related policies of the EU and its members (Fig. 1). The ETNO lobbied for an international 
online privacy standard and simplification of rules governing data transfers. It argued that these 
measures would enable European companies to compete on the same level as those in the U.S. 
(Ingthorsson, 2011). In response to these and other pressures, the EU and its members have 
shown willingness to enact cloud friendly laws, revise existing laws and collaborate with other 
institutional actors. The Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda, Neelie Kroes, for instance, emphasized the critical role the cloud can play in the 
economic growth of the member countries and emphasized the need to develop appropriate 
regulative framework (Thiel & Valpuesta, 2011). 
 
3.2. Normative institutions and their evolution 
Normative institutions introduce “a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social 
life” (Scott, 1995, p. 37). This component focuses on the values and norms held by individuals 
and organizations that influence the functioning of the cloud industry. The basis of compliance in 
the case of normative institutions derives from professional and social obligations. Non-
adherence can thus result in societal and professional sanctions. 
 
An association's norms, informal rules, and codes of behavior can create order, without the law's 
coercive power, by relying on a decentralized enforcement process where noncompliance is 
penalized with social and/or economic sanctions (North, 1990). A profession is self-regulated by 
codes of ethics, which require members to maintain higher standards of conduct than required by 
law (Backoff & Martin, 1991; Cohen & Pant, 1991). 
 
Normative institutions also include trade/professional associations (e.g., the AICPA, and the 
European Telecommunications Network Operator's Association (ETNO)), industry groups or 
non-profit organizations (e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center) that can use 
social/professional obligation requirements (e.g., ethical codes of conduct) to induce certain 
behaviors in the cloud industry and market. 
 
A lesson from other economic sectors is that professional and trade associations are likely to 
emerge to play unique roles in shaping the industry in the absence of well-developed regulative 
institutions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996 and Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009). There have already 
been some successful attempts at the association and inter-organizational levels to challenge the 
appropriateness of the current institutional arrangement. In the future even higher, broader and 
more significant institutional changes can be anticipated if only for the fact that the cloud has 
brought transformational shifts. 
 
3.2.1. Associations representing cloud users 
Professional associations are constantly emerging and influencing security and privacy issues in 
the cloud in new ways as a result of their expertise and interests in this issue. A visible example 
is the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) (www.cloudsecurityalliance.org), a vendor-neutral group 
of information security professionals. The CSA is working on a set of best practices as well as 
information security standards and vendor risk management processes for providers (Crosman, 
2010). The CSA has prepared a list of over 200 questions that cover key issues such as data 
integrity, security architecture, audits, legal/regulatory compliance, governance, and physical 
security. The IT industry association, CompTIA has recommended that organizations should 
consider these as resources in evaluating vendors (Olavsrud, 2012). 
 
Some established trade and professional associations have a vested interest in security and 
privacy issues in the cloud. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is making 
efforts to accelerate cloud adoption among its 350,000 members. The AICPA's resources, 
expertise and experience would make it easier for it to assess and monitor the performance of 
cloud vendors, which can help minimize risks for its members. Paychex, a payroll-solutions 
provider, was the first cloud provider to win the AICPA's official endorsement. The AICPA also 
endorsed bill.com for invoice management and payment in 2008. In 2009, it endorsed financial 
management and accounting software maker Intacct and tax-automation supplier Copanion. The 
AICPA's endorsements are based on an extensive due diligence on the security practices of the 
vendors (McCann, 2010). 
 
3.2.2. Inter-organizational bodies representing cloud vendors 
An inter-organizational system gives the vendors the power of collective action and cooperative 
endeavor to pursue shared goals which may not be possible if each vendor acts in isolation. A 
related point is that political processes tend to have a built-in bias that favors organized groups 
compared to those that are unorganized (Mitra, 1999). Industries such as cloud computing, are 
likely to benefit from compatibility. For instance, competitive effects associated with 
compatibility can lead to reduced price and entries of new cloud vendors. Cloud users' decision 
to switch vendors, however, is likely to be determined by the existing vendor's data-handling 
policy or their ability to access and delete data with the vendor. Research conducted in other 
industries indicates that the choice of industry standards is often the result of complex 
negotiation among industry participants (Farrell, 1987). In the context of this paper, a goal of 
such negotiation would be to strengthen security and privacy issues and enhance the 
trustworthiness of this industry (e.g., having an industry-wide secure and trustworthy data-
handling policy). 
 
Some argue that industry standards organizations may address many of the user concerns related 
to privacy and security (Object Management Group, 2009). In the institutional field formed 
around cloud security, the entry of organizations such as Object Management Group (OMG), the 
Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF), the Open Grid Forum (OGF), and the Storage 
Networking Industry Association (SNIA) have led to efforts that are likely to shift the field 
towards higher security levels because cloud security has been among the top agenda of these 
organizations (Wittow & Buller, 2010). 
 
A related point is that there are no formal processes for auditing cloud platforms (Vizard, 2010). 
Analysts argue that auditing standards to assess a service provider's control over data (e.g., SAS 
70) or other information security specifications (e.g., the International Organization for 
Standardization's ISO 27001) are regarded as irrelevant and insufficient to deal with and address 
the unique security issues facing the cloud (Brodkin, 2010 and gartner.com, 2010). These 
standards and specifications were not developed specifically for the cloud. 
 
Recent widely publicized security incidents of Epsilon and Amazon Web Services, despite their 
SAS 70 certification, indicate that that these certifications have provided false assurance to users 
regarding cloud security. Schroeder (2011, para. 8) comments: “SAS 70 didn't, doesn't, and 
never will provide assurances for functions such as security and privacy (Epsilon) and security 
and operational performance (AWS)”. The cloud's disruptive and transformative nature is likely 
to lead to push for standards that are designed specifically for the cloud industry. 
 
3.3. Cultural-cognitive institutions and their evolution 
Cultural-cognitive institutions are “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social 
reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 2001, p. 57). Cognitive programs 
are built on the mental maps of individuals and thus function primarily at the individual level 
(Huff, 1990). Compliance in cognitive legitimacy concerns is due to habits. Organizations and 
individuals may not even be aware that they are complying. It is important to consider the effect 
of the mental maps with respect to the cloud as well as cloud providers. 
 
3.3.1. Perception of vendor's integrity and capability 
Cloud computing raises issues related to privacy, security and confidentiality if only for the fact 
that the users may think that service provider may deliberately or accidentally disclose the data 
or use for malicious purposes (Ryan, 2011). Of particular concern is thus the users' perception of 
the dependability of cloud vendors' security assurances and practices. As noted earlier, issues 
such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data related to ineffective or noncompliant 
controls of service providers, data backup for disaster recovery and third-party backup locations 
are of concerns to cloud users (Allen, 2011; Table 1). Organizations are also concerned that 
cloud providers may use insecure ways to delete data once services have been provided (e.g., 
disposing hard disks without deleting cloud users' data) (Wilshusen, 2010). 
 
The above perceptions are enhanced by the fact that cloud providers allegedly do not answer 
questions and fail to give enough evidence to trust them (Brodkin, 2010). Businesses and 
industry analysts are concerned about the cloud providers' so-called “don't ask, don't tell” 
approach and have argued that information about data center locations and practices are arguably 
treated like “national security secrets” (Messmer, 2010). 
 
It is worth noting that malicious insider risks are among the most important risks that the 
cyberspace faces. According to a report released by the FBI in 2006, over 40% of attacks 
originate inside an organization (Regan, 2006). While no reported case involving the engagement 
of a cloud vendor's employee in data breach has yet been found, such risks cannot be ignored. 
One fear has been that intellectual property and other sensitive information stored in the cloud 
could be stolen. Worse still, cloud providers may not notify their clients about security breaches. 
Evidence indicates that many businesses tend to underreport cybercrimes due to embarrassment, 
concerns related to credibility and reputation damages and fears of stock price drops (Kshetri, 
2010). An organization's data in the cloud may be stolen but it may not ever be aware that such 
incidents had happened. 
 
3.3.2. Cloud users' and providers' inertia effects 
Emphasizing the importance of cultural changes in the cloud environment, Microsoft's Dave 
Coplin recently put the issue this way: Moving into the cloud is a cultural shift as well as a 
technology shift (Weber, 2011). It is quite possible that organizational inertia may affect the lens 
through which users view security and privacy issues. Organizational inertia can be defined as 
formal organizations' tendency to resist internal changes to respond to external changes (Larsen 
& Lomi, 2002), which may constrain a firm's ability to exploit emerging opportunities (Dean & 
Meyer, 1996). An inertia effect (resistance to change) is likely to adversely influence 
organizations' assessment of the cloud from the security and privacy standpoints because they 
may not be comfortable about losing some of the features of the non-cloud environment such as 
control on data. 
 
Related to a cultural shift, reduction in control due to the shared and dynamic resources in the 
cloud environment is a concern. Cloud users have no access to and physical control over the 
hardware and other resources that store and process their data and information (Wilshusen, 
2010). Cloud services contracts, however, often stipulate that data protection is the user's 
responsibility (Crosman, 2009). A case in point is Google. The company provides security and 
privacy assurances to its Google Docs users unless the users publish them online or invite 
collaborators. However, Google service agreements explicitly make it clear that the company 
provides no warranty or bears no liability for harm in case of Google's negligence to protect the 
privacy and security (Wittow & Buller, 2010). 
 
Just as important is the need for change in preference for localness. From the standpoint of 
security, most users tend to prefer computing functions locally on site (Brynjolfsson, Hofmann, 
& Jordan, 2010). Organizations arguably ask: Who would trust their essential data out there 
somewhere? (Armbrust et al., 2010). 
 
On the supply side, cultural changes in cloud providers' views towards security practices are also 
important. A commonplace observation is that while cloud providers offer sophisticated services, 
their performances have been weak in policies and practices (Wittow and Buller, 2010 and 
Greengard and Kshetri, 2010). For instance, John Chambers, the Cisco Systems chairman argued 
that the cloud's security issues cannot be handled in traditional ways as this technology has 
presented many new and unique challenges (Talbot, 2010). 
 
4. Forces and nature of institutional changes in the cloud industry 
4.1. Forces of institutional changes in the cloud industry 
They focus on three inter-related issues associated with the cloud: dense networks of actors 
created by the technology's transformative nature, power dynamics, and contradictions that have 
emerged with the diffusion of this technology. 
 
4.1.1. Formation of dense networks and relationships in the cloud industry 
Prior research indicates that paradigm shifts involve a social learning process that may comprise 
numerous and diverse participants with broad social and economic demands and interests who 
want to accomplish multiple purposes that are not always congruent (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993 and Hall, 1993). Unsurprisingly, due to the cloud's dynamic and transformative nature, it is 
drawing diverse actors. Some of the key actors and interactions among them in the thickening 
institutional field formed around cloud security are presented in Fig. 1. The attitudes, behavior 
and expectations of these actors influence the equilibrium of the game in the cloud industry 
(Snidal, 1996, p. 128). 
 
As noted above, these actors seem to be in the mobilization stage (Purdy & Gray, 2009) and 
there is a significant trend towards collaboration, coordination and communication among them. 
The cloud has led to the generation of new interactions among private sector agents (e.g., the 
CSA and CompTIA). Powerful cloud vendors are also encouraging public–private interactions, 
leading the coordination efforts and influencing national and international policy-making 
processes, which may improve cloud security. In January 2011, Microsoft general counsel spoke 
to the French National Assembly and urged to lower cloud barriers (O'Brien, 2011). At the event, 
fueling the European Economy (http://www.microsoft.eu/innovation-in-society/events/event-
fueling-the-european-economy.aspx) hosted by Microsoft in Brussels, Neelie Kroes, Vice-
President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, gave a keynote 
speech and emphasized that the Commission's proposal would improve privacy and allow for the 
development and deployment of cloud services (Ashford, 2012). 
 
Kroes also urged cloud providers and users to participate in talks about security and 
technical/commercial standardization (Thiel & Valpuesta, 2011). At the 2012 World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the EU announced the European Cloud Partnership, which focuses 
on the public sector's role. The idea in the partnership is to help make the cloud more appropriate 
for the public sector and increase the public sector's involvement in the cloud. In a blog 
(http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/neelie-kroes/european-cloud-partnership/), Kroes noted that cloud 
vendors, industry bodies and associations such as SAP, Digital Europe, EuroCloud, OpenForum 
Europe, TechAmerica Europe, and Google reacted positively to the partnership. This is a sign of 
an increasing level of public–private interaction. 
 
The above activities are indicative of the formation of a dense network of relationships among 
various actors in the institutional field formed around cloud security, which is likely to reduce 
incentives for opportunism (Axelrod & Cohen, 2001). Dense relationships and interactions are 
also likely to generate a lot of gossips, which would help enhance trust. For instance, if formal 
mechanisms are created to provide trust on the cloud, vendors and users do not have to depend 
on personal or organizational characteristics or past exchange history. Zucker (1986) refers this 
phenomenon as institutionally based trust. 
 
4.1.2. The power dynamics in the cloud industry 
The various entrepreneurial initiatives and activities that accompany the development of the 
cloud industry have been highly noticeable and difficult to ignore. In this regard, there is much to 
learn from policy entrepreneurship, which entails recognizing and promoting an understanding of 
a political landscape or transforming it in order to create new opportunities (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993). 
 
It is important to develop an adequate description of the relative distribution of power in order to 
understand the nature of negotiations and interactions among various players. The sources and 
nature of powers of various key actors are discussed above and presented in Table 2. Here, they 
mainly focus on power dynamics from the perspective of exchange relationships. Exchange 
relationships in an industry are influenced by the relative power and dependence of the actors 
(Emerson, 1962 and Fligstein and Dauter, 2007). What interests them about the current power 
dynamics between users and providers of cloud is that these actors are helping to move the 
institutional field around cloud industry closer to the structuration stage. 
 
Dropbox's updates in its terms and conditions in response to user pressures (Table 2) and other 
similar examples indicate that users' relative power vis-a-vis providers has increased with intense 
competition. Cloud users are leveraging this increased power to force providers to take measures 
to enhance privacy and security. Using the term that Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale (2005, p. 810) 
do, they can say that cloud users have employed power tactics in an attempt to strengthen their 
power vis-a-vis the providers. 
 
The contracts that involved Google and Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) with the City of 
Los Angeles is an example that is illustrative of how traditional contracts between service 
providers and clients fail to address the legal and structural issues. Over time cloud users are 
likely to realize how incomplete or vague contracts may expose them to various risks. The 
increased relative power is likely to enable them to push for contracts that are more detailed and 
more complete. They may also create intense pressure for a regulatory response that properly 
addresses security and privacy issues and shift at least some of the legal responsibility from the 
user to the vendor (Fig. 1). 
 
Cloud vendors, on the other hand, are increasing their capacity to negotiate with and influence 
the users by offering them new, innovative and potentially attractive value propositions. Put 
differently, they are attempting to increase their “potential power” (Kim et al., 2005, p. 803). 
One example is the vendor, HiDrive Free. The company's selling proposition is that its data 
centers are hosted in Germany, a country with among the strictest privacy laws (Table 2). Cloud 
providers are thus reacting to a perceived decline in power by engaging in proactive behaviors to 
develop more secure products. 
 
4.1.3. Contradictions associated with the cloud 
A simple approach to understand institutional changes associated with the cloud would be to 
look at the various contradictions and dilemmas that the cloud produces with the existing 
institutional arrangements, which are likely to shape decision-making processes of key 
institutional actors. Institutional theorists view this as accumulated results of organizations' 
continuous isomorphic adaptations (Burns & Nielsen, 2006). If they look from this viewpoint, 
institutional changes can be seen as an outcome of the dynamic interactions of contradictions and 
“praxis” (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 222). That is, institutional actors continuously engage in the 
process of enactment, embodiment and interpretation of theories, lessons and skills, which leads 
to institutional changes. 
 
First, conformance to the existing institutions may be at the expense of technical and functional 
efficiency, which is likely to act as a force of institutional changes. As noted above, the ETNO 
has emphasized the importance of changing rules related to online privacy and data transfers, so 
that European companies can compete on the same level as those in the U.S. (Ingthorsson, 2011). 
Likewise, the EU is working to develop appropriate regulative framework due to the critical role 
of the cloud in the economic growth of the member countries (Thiel & Valpuesta, 2011). Seo and 
Creed (2002, p. 226) refer this type of contradiction as “legitimacy that undermines functional 
inefficiency”. 
 
Service providers respond to the rapidly changing IT environment by making adaptations that 
help them to maintain competitive advantage in the new technological landscape. The continuous 
adaptation has resulted in a competency trap whereby IT service providers attempt to pursue cost 
management programs such as minimizing the total cost of ownership (TCO). Many services 
providers have shown an inability to adapt to the environment of the cloud, which poses unique 
security problems. Seo and Creed (2002, p. 226) refer this phenomenon as “adaptation that 
undermines adaptability” in which “adaptive moves make adopters less able to adapt over the 
long run”. As security and privacy issues are becoming more important, cloud users are 
demanding an explicit guarantee of data security and liability clauses in contracts with their 
cloud vendors. Users' pressures to Dropbox to update its terms and conditions regarding data 
security and ownership can serve as an example to illustrate this point (Table 2). 
 
Third, the legitimacy seeking process may require appeasing multiple institutions that are 
conflicting and inconsistent. This type of contradiction is referred as “isomorphism that conflicts 
with divergent interests” which may act as a trigger for institutional change (Seo & Creed, 2002, 
p. 226). For instance, IT companies such as Oracle, Cisco Systems, SAP, Apple, Google and 
Microsoft lobbied to streamline EU's fragmented national data protection laws (O'Brien, 2011). 
 
Finally, businesses, industry bodies and government organizations in some countries have 
achieved some progress towards developing institutions that are more or less compatible with 
other prevailing institutions in their countries. These intra-national measures are in conflict with 
the frameworks adopted by other countries. Such inconsistencies are described as “intra-
institutional conformity that creates inter-institutional incompatibilities”, which are likely to 
bring about pressures for changes (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 226). To take an example, the EU 
member states are working to align privacy laws and close the existing jurisdictional gaps across 
the member states. 
 
4.2. The nature of likely changes in cloud related institutions 
According to a rational choice perspective, a firm is likely to pursue strategies that maximize its 
overall profitability. However, when external forces threaten organizations' business models, 
they are likely to engage in experimentation in a variety of ways (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez, & 
Velamuri, 2010) with “changing mix of technological and market conduct” (Antonelli, 1993, p. 
625). 
 
Regarding the potential changes in a company's strategies, there is another lesson to be learned 
from the functioning of a political landscape. In most cases, policy changes are likely to take 
place only incrementally (Lindbolm, 1959). Moreover, policies changes often happen in a 
reactive rather than a proactive fashion (Lindblom, 1968). To put things in context, cloud 
vendors are likely to change their business models and routine strategies in response to various 
pressures. As noted earlier, the cloud provider, Dropbox, which was forced to update its terms 
and conditions in response to customers' dissatisfaction with the clause detailing data ownership 
issues, serves as an illustrative example (Table 2). 
 
In the cloud industry, the vendors are likely to face unprecedented pressure to gain customer 
trust. The production of trust, however, is a time consuming process. For cloud vendors it 
requires engagement in exchange processes with the clients and fulfillment of “transactional 
obligations” (Bailey, Gurak, & Konstan, 2003, p. 312). That is, users' willingness to confer trust 
on vendors is a function of the latter's history of providing a trustworthy cloud computing 
resources, services and environment. 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
While technological development to address the security concerns is critical, institutional 
measures such as clearer regulatory frameworks and other trust producing initiatives are no less 
important. Due to the cloud's transformative and far-reaching impacts and significance, it has 
drawn diverse actors and participants with different perspectives that have broad social and 
economic demands and interests. These participants vary widely in resources, expertise, 
experience and power and their actions are aimed at accomplishing multiple political, social and 
economic goals, which are far from congruent. In fast developing technologies such as the cloud, 
the institutional change patterns do not seem to reflect the linearity observed in more mature 
industry. National governments' and supra-national agencies' roles in the development of cloud 
related institutions have been mostly passive and reactive rather than active and self-initiated. 
Since some non-profit organizations and industry bodies as well as various associations 
representing cloud vendors and users have been relatively active and some of them are also 
engaged in organized lobbying efforts to influence national/international policy making, it is 
reasonable to expect that the development of normative institutions is likely to be followed by 
the development of regulative institutions. As in the case of the internet Domain Name System 
(DNS), the development of regulative institutions in the cloud industry is likely to be an ex post 
facto legitimation of a the codification of industry norms.1 It is anticipated that the salience of an 
institutional component may also vary over time. For instance, barriers associated with newness 
and inertia effects are likely to decline over time. On the other hand, as the penetration level, 
width and depth of clouds increase, they may be more attractive cybercrime targets which would 
mean that the importance of cloud security would further increase. 
 
The above discussion has implications for implications for cloud providers, users and policy 
makers. 
 
5.1. Implications for cloud providers 
Most cloud providers' services come with no assurance or promise of a given level of security 
and privacy. Nor is that their only problem. Cloud providers have also allegedly demonstrated a 
tendency to reduce their liability by proposing contracts with the service provided as is with no 
warranty (McCafferty, 2010). Perception of ineffectiveness or noncompliance of cloud providers 
may thus act as a roadblock to organizations' cloud adoption decisions. In this regard, security 
and privacy measures designed to reduce perceived risk as well as transparency and clear 
communication processes would create a competitive advantage for cloud providers. 
 
Cloud vendors may address many of the user concerns by becoming more transparent. Since 
regulative institutions related to liability and other issues are not well developed, cloud providers 
may feel pressures to obtain endorsements from professional societies. AICPA's endorsements 
have driven the diffusion of cloud applications among some CPA firms. 
 
5.2. Implications for cloud users 
The newness and uniqueness of the cloud often mean that clients would not know what to ask for 
in investment decisions. Most users are functioning on the assumption that cloud providers 
possess a reasonable capability and are willing to protect privacy and security of their data 
(Wittow & Buller, 2010). However, against the backdrop of the current institutional and 
technological contexts, this assumption may not always be realistic. Given the institutional 
environment, potential adopters may need to ask tough questions to vendors regarding 
certification from auditing and professional organizations, data center locations, and background 
checks of employees. 
 
The above analysis suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach may not work for all user 
organizations' cloud adoption. For instance, organizations may have to make decisions 
concerning combinations of public and private clouds. A public cloud is effective for an 
organization handling high-transaction/low-security or low data value (e.g., sales force 
automation). Private cloud model, on the other hand, may be appropriate for enterprises and 
applications that face significant risk from information exposure such as financial institutions 
and health care provider or federal agency. For instance, for medical-practice companies dealing 
with sensitive patient data, which are required to comply with the HIPAA rules, private cloud 
may be appropriate. 
 
Other issues of particular relevance and concern for cloud users are government overreach and 
the cloud's potential to be the ultimate spying machine. There are stories of espionage activities' 
successful transition to cyber-espionage2.0 and national and international security issues. A 
Google's report released in April 2010 is especially timely and enlightening. The company 
described how government authorities around the world request the company for private 
information and to censor its applications. 
 
There have been concerns about possible overreach by law enforcement agencies. In the U.S., for 
instance, thanks to the 2001 Patriot Act, the federal government can ask service providers for 
details of a user's activities without telling the user. The FBI's audits indicated the possibility of 
overreach by the agency in accessing internet users' information (Zittrain, 2009). 
 
For some analysts, the biggest concern has been the government's increased ability to access 
business and consumer data, and a lack of constitutional protections against these actions 
(Talbot, 2010). Especially, the cloud is likely to provide authoritarian regimes a fertile ground 
for cyber-control and spying activities. 
 
5.3. Implications for policy makers 
Since geographic dispersion of data is an important factor associated with cost and performance 
of the cloud, an issue that deserves mention relates to regulatory arbitrage, which means that 
cloud vendors can take advantage of loopholes in regulatory systems of certain jurisdictions to 
reduce risks. Economies worldwide vary greatly in the legal systems. Experts expect that, at least 
for the short run, countries are likely to update their laws individually rather than acting in a 
multilateral fashion (TR, 2010). Due to the newness, jurisdictional arbitrage is higher for the 
cloud compared to the IT industry in general. In this regard critics are concerned that cloud 
providers may store sensitive information in jurisdictions that have weak laws related to privacy, 
protection and availability of data (Edwards, 2009). Given the cloud's significance to economic 
competitiveness and national security, policy makers need to look at developments in cloud-
related institutions in other countries and take proactive measures to enact and enforce laws for 
developing the cloud industry. 
 
5.4. Future research 
Before concluding, several potentially fruitful avenues for future research are suggested. Cloud-
related institutions are currently thin and dysfunctional. As noted above, privacy and security 
issues of in the cloud currently fall into a legally gray area. Future research might examine how 
political, ethical, social and cultural factors are associated with security issues in cloud 
computing. 
 
As noted above, prior research has suggested that building a regulative/law pillar system is the 
first stage of field formation. It is followed by a formation of normative institutions and then 
cognitive institutions (Hoffman, 1999). In this regard, a comparison of the nature of institutional 
evolution in the cloud industry with those in other economic sectors might be worthwhile target 
of study. 
 
Second, an empirical examination of core premises of this paper would be useful for studying the 
institutional drivers of the cloud industry. Such a study would shed light on the relative 
importance of various factors discussed above in organizations' cloud adoption decision. 
 
Finally, future research might also explore antecedents of organizations' cloud computing 
decisions in terms of various technological dimensions identified in the prior literature. One 
avenue would be to test how the cloud performs in terms of major dimensions proposed by 
Rogers (1995) such as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, observability and 
trialability. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
The cloud's vast storage capabilities and availability of an array of contents and applications also 
poses monumental risks related to privacy and security. This issue is very significant for cloud 
diffusion as organizations are using the cloud to perform increasingly strategic and mission 
critical functions. At the same time, cloud providers are facing pressures and challenges to 
protect information assets belonging to their customers and other sensitive data. A related point 
is that there is currently a big gap between what cloud vendors claim and what the existing and 
potential adopters think about the cloud's security. On the plus side, industry players are realizing 
a need to develop standards to provide the guidance necessary for security and privacy. As a 
result of various organized and individual efforts, positive changes in cloud-related institutions 
can be anticipated. 
 
Cloud users are becoming educated and are bringing more holistic perspectives to incorporate all 
the relevant issues that are important to them such as cost saving, productivity gain, security and 
privacy issues and, voice and control over data. They have also changed their behavior in 
response to changing perceptions of benefits and risks and their potential and realized power. 
Over time, this may give venders a better assessment of clients' needs and power, which may 
lead to an effective tailoring of services and improvements in security. 
 
Nation states and international actors are also facing unprecedented demands, challenges and 
pressures to introduce new regulations, change the existing regulations and in some cases, close 
loopholes in the existing regulations. They hope that these measures would help enhance national 
security as well as security/privacy of user data, increase national competitiveness in technology 
and facilitate cloud adoption by consumers and organizations. 
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